Louisiana Law Review
Volume 14 | Number 3
April 1954

Contracts - Parol Evidence - Admissibility to Prove
Collateral Agreement
William J. Doran Jr.

Repository Citation
William J. Doran Jr., Contracts - Parol Evidence - Admissibility to Prove Collateral Agreement, 14 La. L. Rev. (1954)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol14/iss3/20

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

VOL. XIV

CONTRACTS-PAROL EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY TO PROVE
COLLATERAL AGREEMENT
Plaintiff sold land to the defendant by a notarial act, and
later brought suit to recover damages for wrongful conversion
of certain farm implements which were left on the premises.
Plaintiff claimed that it was understood by the parties that these
implements were not to be included in the sale. He offered parol
and non-authentic written evidence to show the existence of a
prior agreement by which the machinery in question was to
remain the property of the plaintiff, not being transferred to the
defendant either in the act of sale or in a prior written contract
to sell farm machinery.' The Supreme Court, in reversing the
judgment given for the plaintiff in the lower court, held that the
extrinsic evidence was not admissible because it was not needed
to clarify the description of the property, nor did it purport to
show a contemporaneous collateral agreement not appearing
in the deed. Smith v. Bell, 68 So.2d 737 (La. 1953).
The courts have generally held that parol evidence is not
admissible to vary the terms of a written contract. 2 This exclusionary rule is based on Articles 2236 and 22763 of the Louisiana
Civil Code.
Article 2236 states that "The authentic act is full proof of the
agreement contained in it, against the contracting parties and
their heirs or assigns, unless it be declared and proved a forgery."
Though it provides that the authentic act is full proof of the
agreement contained in it, and by implication that parol evidence
shall not be admitted to vary that agreement, it does not mention
prior agreements between the parties. Therefore, it seems that
Article 2236 would allow the introduction of parol evidence to
prove the existence of a prior collateral agreement entered into
by the parties.
Neither does it appear that Article 22764 prohibits the proof
of collateral agreements, since it provides only that parol evidence shall not be admitted against or beyond what is contained
1. This could not be determined from the official reports, but was found
upon an examination of the plaintiff's briefs.
2. Lawrence v. Claiborne, 215 La. 785, 41 So.2d

680 (1949);

Franton v.

Rusca, 187 La. 578, 175 So. 66 (1937).
3. Art. 2276, LA. CIVIL CODs of 1870: "Neither shall parol evidence

be

admitted against or beyond what is contained in the acts, nor on what may

have been said before, at the time of making them, or since."
4. See note 3 supra.
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in the act. In Dwight v. Linton 5 the court said that Article 22766
was inapplicable to a case where the evidence was offered neither
to contradict nor to explain the written instrument but only to
prove a collateral fact or agreement in relation to it. In Brandin
Slate Co. v. Fornea,7 it was held that parol evidence is admissible
to prove a collateral agreement which does not contradict the
writing, but merely covers an additional and collateral undertaking.
Article 22398 illustrates another case where proof of a collateral agreement, even in direct contradiction of an authentic
act, is permitted by the code itself.
At common law the parol evidence rule is applicable only in
cases where there is an integration of all prior agreements.9 It
does not prohibit the introduction of parol evidence to prove an
oral agreement varying the terms of a written instrument when
the oral agreement is (1) collateral in form, (2) not contradictory
to the express or implied provisions of the writing, and (3) not
the type ordinarily put into writing.10
Whether or not there is an integration of all prior agreements in the written contract depends upon the intent of the
parties, which must be determined from all the circumstances
surrounding the making of the contract.1 In some cases parol
evidence must of necessity be admitted to prove the parties'
intention to integrate all prior agreements. Admitting it for that
purpose does not offend the general rule against parol evidence
because it is not used in this context to vary the terms of the
written contract. 1 2 Formal writings such as deeds can usually
be shown not to be complete integrations of the agreement. At
best they are only partial integrations. 18
The court in the instant case said that the plaintiff's only
purpose in offering the parol evidence was to contradict the terms
of the written instrument. However, in view of the circum5. 3 Rob. 57 (La. 1842).
6. Art. 2256, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1825.
7. 183 So. 572 (La. App. 1938).
8. Art. 2239, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870: "Counter letters can have no effect
against creditors or bona fide purchasers; they are valid as to all others; but
forced heirs shall have the same right to annul absolutely and by parol evidence the simulated contracts of those from whom they inherit, and shall not
be restricted to the legitimate."
9. 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 573 (1951); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 237 (1932).
10. Mitchill v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377, 160 N.E. 646, 68 A.L.R. 239 (1928). See
also 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 583.
11. See Note, 70 A.L.R. 752 (1931).
12. 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 263, § 581.
13. Id. at 298, § 587.
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stances surrounding the prior contract to sell machinery, there
seems to have been a collateral unwritten agreement to let the
plaintiff retain the machinery not specifically mentioned in the
contract to sell, transferring the remaining machinery with the
property. If this was not their understanding the prior contract
to sell the machinery would have been unnecessary, since all of
the machinery would have been transferred by the notarial act
of sale. 14 Further, the very fact that the prior contract was
formed shows that the parties did not intend to integrate their
complete agreement in the notarial act of sale.
The parties apparently intended that their agreement be
contained both in the notarial act and in the prior contract to
sell the machinery, which was collateral to the notarial act, and
which gave rise to the unwritten agreement alleged by the plaintiff. It is submitted, therefore, that the parol evidence should
have been admitted to determine if these were their actual intentions. If they did intend to integrate their agreements, parol
evidence should not be allowed to vary the terms of the written
act; if they did not so intend, effect should have been given to
the collateral agreements revealed by the parol evidence.
William J. Doran, Jr.

INSURANcE-AcTION AGAINST LIABILITY INSURER BY NAmED INSURED

Plaintiff brought suit against his liability insurance carrier
for damages resulting from injuries he suffered when his car, in
which he was a passenger, was involved in an accident while his
wife was driving. Circumstances of the accident clearly established the negligence of the wife. Held, the provisions of the
policy authorized, recovery by the named insured against his
insurer. McDowell v. National Surety Corp., 68 So.2d 189 (La.
App. 1953).
The courts have previously held that under the Louisiana
Direct Action Statute' only general defenses of the insured can
be urged by the insurer. Thus, a party can recover from a spouse's
liability insurer even though the defense of coverture, a personal
14. Art. 468, LA. CVL CODE of 1870.

1. LA. R.S. § 22:655 (1950).

For a general discussion of this statute, see

Comment, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 495 (1953).

